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ABSTRACT
The precise moment that triggered the EU referendum had its roots
in the Europhobia that lurked within the soul of the Conservative
Party. It has been deeply perturbing to witness such Europhobia
played out in the form of an internal party political melodrama
while the scandalous socio-economic ﬁssures that fed the Brexit
insurgence appeared to represent a mere side-show. Taking
inspiration from recent work on Brexit as a critical conjuncture, this
paper examines how part of this insurgence emerged as a ‘revolt of
the regions’ led by communities that had endured sustained
economic dispossession of public goods and services further
exacerbated by the steadfast commitment by Conservative-led
governments to a politics of austerity. In then sharpening the focus
on to Stoke-on-Trent – baptized ‘Capital of Brexit’ in light of its
status as the city with the highest Leave majority – the paper
reveals deep-seated political disaﬀection as people railed against
prolonged economic abandonment and social injustice. It further
identiﬁes how at the very heart of the Brexit conjuncture was a
growing disconnect between citizens and the institutions of
government, what amounts to a gradual exhaustion of consent for
the neoliberal political economic mainstream. It has also resulted in
a highly discordant state that is struggling to balance the process of
extricating the UK from the EU with the management of a society
that is now more imbalanced than at any time in living memory.
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There were people turning up who had never voted before. They did it this time because they
were very angrywith what they felt had been done to them in their communities over decades –
the decline of industry, the rapid increase in people coming to this country, the levels of aus-
terity. In a general election they might think it doesn’t matter who you vote for because they’re
all the same. In the referendum they recognised this could lead to something diﬀerent (Will
Straw, Executive Director Britain Stronger in Europe campaign; cited in Behr, 2016).
There are many lessons from the referendum, but a clear one is that many people now feel
that they have little or no control over their lives. There is a sense of powerlessness that mocks
the self-governing promise of democracy. In this context, the EU referendum seemed to oﬀer
an opportunity to reclaim lost power – over our laws, over our rulers, over our borders – that
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was eagerly taken, despite the authoritative warnings about the dire economic consequences
of doing so (Wright, 2017, p. 191).
1. Approaching Brexit: a ruptural conjuncture
On 23 June 2016, the citizens of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern
Ireland were asked to vote on the following question: ‘Should the United Kingdom
remain a member of the European Union or leave the European Union?’ The outcome
of the plebiscite was dependent on a simple majority. And at 0440 on 24 June, television
and radio stations began calling the result: on a turnout of over 72 per cent, 51.9 per cent
had voted to leave. Within moments, Nigel Farage, ebullient leader of the United Kingdom
Independence Party (UKIP), faced the cameras and applauded a ‘victory for real people’.
Pound sterling began tumbling. By 0815, the Prime Minister, David Cameron, had ten-
dered his resignation. It is well nigh impossible to overstate the societal shockwaves
that ensued: the New York Times headlining simply with ‘British stun the world with
vote to leave the EU’. Closer to home some vehemently anti-EU tabloid newspapers
rejoiced with headlines of ‘We’re Out’ (Daily Mail) and ‘See EU Later’ (Sun) (Beckett,
2016). In the Financial Times, Philip Stephens (2016) described ‘a vote that changed every-
thing [with] economic and foreign policies crafted over nearly half a century overturned in
the course of a single night’, while his colleague, Martin Wolf, deﬁned it as ‘probably the
most disastrous single event in British history since the second world war’. The Guardian
columnist, Timothy Garton Ash, lamented the outcome as a ‘body blow to the West, and
to the ideas of international cooperation, liberal order and open societies’.
Amid such melodramatic and caustically divided opinion, the result was also inferred to
symbolize a United Kingdom now patently disunited. Indeed an Economist (2016) leader
concluded how the
division between London, which voted strongly for Remain, and the north, which did the
reverse, reveals a sharply polarised country, with a metropolitan elite that likes globalisation
on one side and an angry working class that does not on the other.
Even allowing for the pithiness demanded of a hot-press editorial, this rudimentary asser-
tion is misleading and a simpliﬁcation of the intricate sociology and geography of the Brexit
vote. For sure, the proportion of the working class that voted Leave was 63 per cent, signiﬁ-
cantly higher than the 44 per cent of middle class voters1. It was nonetheless the latter group
which constituted two-thirds of the total vote in the referendum: the upshot ofwhich is that 59
per cent of those who voted for Brexit were in fact middle class (Dorling, 2016). Moreover,
while across England the highest regional proportions for Vote Leave were in the East and
West Midlands followed by the North East and Yorkshire and Humberside, with the excep-
tion of London, the southern regions also voted majority leave and in signiﬁcantly large
numbers to prove decisive in the outcome (Williams, 2016)2. Polarization was actually
more inter and intra-local than inter-regional. For just as the great northern English cities
of Liverpool and Manchester returned majorities for Remain, so the global cosmopolis of
Greater London was itself punctuated by a 40 per cent vote to leave. The complexity of this
electoral geography was intensiﬁed by the people of Scotland and Northern Ireland voting
to keep their nations inside the European Union, thereby placing the constitutional integrity
of the United Kingdom in jeopardy (Cochrane, 2018; Wright, 2017).
2 G. MACLEOD AND M. JONES
Temporality alsomatters. To be sure, and as will become apparent in the discussion below,
the referendum result brought into sharp focus so-called ‘left behinds’, whether in reference to
people or places (Ford &Goodwin, 2014). Nonetheless, the country did not suddenly become
radically unequal on 23 June 2016. Understanding this demands an appreciation of the dev-
astationwageduponmany communities resulting from thepolitical commitment– embraced
by successive Westminster governments – to a neoliberal accumulation regime increasingly
dependent upon predatory dispossession of public goods and services; and further, in the
wake of the 2008 ﬁnancial crisis an unyielding adherence to amerciless state project of endur-
ing austerity (Hall, Massey, & Rustin, 2013; Harvey, 2012; Jessop, 2018a; Jessop, Bonnett,
Bromley, & Ling, 1988; O’Hara, 2014; Seymour, 2014; Walby, 2015). To therefore posit glo-
balization as an explanation for the Brexit result as per The Economist thereby ‘bleaches
out the crisis-ridden turbulence of contemporary capitalism’ (Watkins, 2016, p. 6). Putting
it more concretely, might an equivalent referendum held in the midst of the debt-ﬁnanced
‘long boom’ which preceded the 2008 crash have provided a diﬀerent outcome (Kitson,
Martin, & Tyler, 2011; Pettifor, 2006)? Furthermore, globalization surely represents ‘an
inadequate proxy for European integration’ (Watkins, 2016, p. 6), about which it must be
assumed a certain proportion of referendum votes were cast. Consider too the temporality
of political epochs and associated sequencing of events: from the acrid ‘Euroscepticism’
that bedevilled the Conservative government of the mid-1990s through to the local electoral
inroads achieved by UKIP in the 2010s, and the moment where Prime Minister Cameron
engaged in the high stakes gamble of promising a referendum in the 2015 Conservative
Party (2015) election manifesto (Clarke, 2018).
All of which at least in part serves to reveal the complex aetiology of Brexit. And yet as
outlined by Clarke and Newman (2017, p. 102), so much ensuing commentary has tended
to ‘oscillate between the immediacy of speciﬁc events (… [like…] ministerial pronounce-
ments) and the search for the deep causes behind Brexit (such as globalization, deindustria-
lization, neo-liberalism, the dispossessed or forgotten working class…)’. They go on to
argue that, given how the moment of Brexit condensed ‘a range of conditions and
causes’ (Clarke &Newman, 2017, p. 102), it is most appropriately interpreted to be a critical
moment in a wider conjuncture. In making this claim, they draw on the pioneering work of
Stuart Hall and colleagues3, which investigated the conjunctural crisis in the political hege-
mony of social democracy in theUK that paved theway for Thatcherism to emerge as a state
project that coupled ‘authoritarian populism’ with a neoliberal economic trajectory. Hall,
Critcher, Jeﬀerson, Clarke, & Roberts (2013, p. xv) interpret the concept of conjuncture
to designate ‘a speciﬁc moment in the life of a social formation and refers to a period in
which the antagonisms and contradictions, which are always at work in society, begin to
“fuse” into a ruptural unity’4. Such an approach invites an appreciation of themiscellaneous
economic trends, the accumulation of social tensions and the gradual erosion of instituted
consent, alongside the sources of political and cultural conﬂict that generated the very con-
ditions for Brexit to happen (Clarke, 2018; Clarke & Newman, 2017). Crucially, then:
Conjunctural analysis […] challenges a narrower focus on the day-to-day dramas of the pol-
itical mainstream [by] look[ing] to the organisations of power blocs, the relation between the
cultural, economic, political and social, and at the ideas and institutions that sustain them
and the relationships between them5 (Grayson & Little, 2017, p. 65).
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Such a perspective demands some analytical focus on the institutional form and the stra-
tegic direction and routine functioning of the state. It is here that Bob Jessop’s strategic-rela-
tional approach to state power might compliment the principles of conjunctural analysis, not
least given his insistence on how the strategic capacity of any given state to perform speciﬁc
actions is only dependent on the balance of economic and social forces and (often informal)
social bases of support that gain access to, and operate through, the state as an institutional
ensemble. In appreciating these inconstant relational arrangements, it becomes possible to
identify how – pace a view of the state as some auto-controlled choreographer of global neo-
liberalism – through a continuous process of strategically selective incorporation, certain
interest groups throughout economy and society are oﬀered privileged access to the various
institutional divisions of the state. It is only through this politically manipulated modality
of instituted state power that the strategic direction and policy interventions of any given
state may be choreographed to favour those very interest groups, classes, places and
regions over subaltern classes and places (Jessop, 1990, 2016). Since June 2016, the Brexit con-
juncture has continued to propel the UK austerity state toward momentous discord. In this
regard Jessop’s perspective could open the conceptual space to examine several key processes
(MacLeavy, 2018), not least: 1) the internal disunity that punctuates several branches of the
state– including the Parliamentary Parties – andwhich continues to frustrate the formulation
of a politically credible path to extricate theUK fromtheEUwhile also aiming to sustaindeliv-
ery of the day-to-day functions of government; and 2) to interrogate the ongoing struggle
within the UK state to mobilize a coherent base of corporate and national-popular support
with which to reassert political legitimacy amid the chaos of Brexit.
The remainder of the paper is presented in four additional sections. Section 2 investigates
how the precise moment that triggered the EU referendum has its roots in the Europhobia
lurking within the soul of the Conservative Party. It has been deeply perturbing to witness
such Europhobia played out periodically in the form of an internal party political melo-
drama while the scandalous socio-economic ﬁssures that fed the Brexit insurgence rep-
resented a mere side-show: for at stake has been the country’s economic future and the
institutional integrity of its state. The subsequent section oﬀers a political economic
autopsy dissecting the relatively high levels of support for Vote Leave in purportedly ‘left
behind’ localities in the north and midlands of England. It reveals the unanticipated
result to be in part a ‘revolt of the regions’, led by communities that had endured sustained
economic dispossession only then to be exacerbated by the steadfast commitment by Con-
servative-led governments toward a politics of austerity. Section 4 sharpens the focus on to
Stoke-on-Trent in the northern west midlands. Baptized ‘Capital of Brexit’ in light of its
status as the citywith the highest Leavemajority, the discussion reveals deep-seated political
disaﬀection, withmany people railing against prolonged economic abandonment and social
injustice. The ﬁnal section identiﬁes how lying at the very heart of the Brexit conjuncture
was a disconnect between citizens and the institutions of government, what amounts to a
gradual exhaustion of consent for the political economicmainstream that has characterized
the last thirty years in the UK. It has also resulted in a highly discordant state that is strug-
gling to balance the process of extricating the UK from the EU with the management of a
society that is now more imbalanced than at any time in living memory (Dorling, 2018).
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2. Alas, they didn’t ‘stop banging on about Europe’: the narrow political
passageway to Britain’s ‘Independence Day’
I will win [the Scottish Referendum] easily and put to bed the Scottish question for twenty
years. The same goes for Europe (UK Prime Minister, David Cameron, speaking in 2014 to
Herman Van Rompuy, former President of the European Council; cited in Callinicos, 2016).
The decision by the British people to leave the European Union is this country’s single biggest
democratic act in modern times… But it is also one of the elite’s most signiﬁcant blunders,
provoked by the most senior politicians for the wrong reasons (Marr, 2016).
It was the autumn of 2006 and the Party conference season. The Conservative and
Unionist Party, Britain’s ‘natural party of government’, was most uncharacteristically
enduring a tenth successive year in opposition. Its new leader, David Cameron, used
his conference speech to implore the Party to ‘stop banging on about Europe’
(Cameron, 2006). His reasoning was that, as alluded to above, for much of the mid-
1990s he had witnessed discernible public wrangling creating havoc within the last Con-
servative government, chieﬂy over the terms of the 1992 Maastricht Treaty on European
integration and in particular its commitment to a ‘social chapter’ (Forster, 2002). This high
watermark ‘Eurosceptism’6 – led by, among others, Michael Howard and John Redwood –
had become suﬃciently toxic to force the then Prime Minister, John Major7, into a ‘back
me or sack me’ vote of conﬁdence on his premiership and did much to discredit the Con-
servative Party’s legitimacy to govern. All of which also thereby helped ease the path for
New Labour’s landslide election victory in 1997 (Kettle, 2016).
Cameron was determined to learn from this. His opportunity came when – in the wake of
the North American ﬁnancial crisis and the consequent erosion of New Labour’s ‘hard-won
status for economic competence’ (Jessop, 2017, p. 35)– the 2010 general election saw theCon-
servatives as the largest party but without an overall majority. Cameron’s pragmatism helped
negotiate a Coalition Government with the unashamedly pro-EU Liberal Democrats. Europe
soon resurfaced though. For the election had bred a new generation of stridently Eurosceptic
ToryMPs,many bitterly resentful of the Coalition (Behr, 2011). InOctober 2011, one of these
tabled a motion for a referendum on EUmembership resulting in 81MPs voting against the
government. Alongside this, concern over the Eurozone crisis, anxiety in certain localities
about immigration from eastern European countries that had gained EU accession in 2004,
and, not unrelatedly, an upsurge in electoral support for UKIP – whose raison d’être was to
withdraw the UK from the EU – had Conservative MPs in marginal constituencies fearing
for their futures (Hobolt, 2016). Such political and economic tumult prompted PrimeMinis-
ter Cameron to countenance a referendum (Watt, 2013). It certainly contravened Coalition
policy. But Deputy Prime Minister, Liberal Democrat Nick Clegg, was more fearful of how
Cameron’s planned action ‘could endanger Britain’s international position for the next few
decades’8. Clegg raised his concerns with Cameron, who admitted: ‘You may be right. But
what else can I do? My backbenchers are unbelievably Eurosceptic and UKIP are breathing
down my neck’ (in Kettle, 2016).
Impelled by such freight and perhaps too his own purported misgivings on closer Euro-
pean integration (Eaton, 2013), in January 2013 Cameron used a speech at the London
headquarters of Bloomberg News to lament the institutional arrangements of the EU as
insuﬃciently nimble to deliver continued prosperity in the wake of the Great Recession
and the Eurozone crisis. He intoned about such unease being especially pronounced in
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Britain: a country that while eager to join the then European Economic Community in 1973
– by which time trade with a shrunken Commonwealth had diminished (Shilliam, 2018) –
has come to view with suspicion any deeper political integration and where successive EU-
wide Treaties bereft of citizen participation have rendered consent for the EU to be ‘wafer
thin’ (Cameron, 2013). In light of which Cameron pressed for a new settlement premised
upon a ‘strong economic base’ facilitated by a single European market but unburdened by
‘excessive regulation’. Most signiﬁcantly he called for a Union which – given the ‘lack of a
single European demos’ (see Mair, 2013) – permits power and democratic accountability
to ‘ﬂow back to member states’ and their parliaments. Audaciously conﬁdent in his divine
capacity to reshape the institutional architecture of the EU, he oﬀered a headline-grabbing
commitment:
The next Conservative Manifesto in 2015 will ask for a mandate from the British people for a
Conservative Government to negotiate a new settlement with our European partners in the
next Parliament.…And when we have negotiated that new settlement, we will give the
British people a referendum with a very simple in or out choice. To stay in the EU on
these new terms; or come out altogether. It will be an in-out referendum.… It is time for
the British people to have their say. It is time to settle this European question in British poli-
tics (Cameron, 2013).
After his Party somewhat unexpectedly achieved an overall majority in the 2015
General Election9, Cameron duly began negotiating this new settlement, promising to
achieve signiﬁcant concessions from Brussels10 (Hobolt, 2016). The process commenced
in June 2015 involving discussions with the President of the European Council, Donald
Tusk, before culminating in a two-day summit with leaders of the other twenty-seven
EU Member States in February 2016 (Clarke, Goodwin, & Whitely, 2017). From this
Cameron secured a Treaty change that would enable British exemption from ‘ever
closer union’, a guarantee that non-Euro nation states remain exempt from funding any
Eurozone bailouts, an ‘emergency safeguard’ to protect the interests of the City of
London, and powers to restrict in-work beneﬁts for EU migrants (Jensen & Snaith,
2016). Nonetheless, responses within Cameron’s own Party ranged from lukewarm to
hostile: veteran Eurosceptic John Redwood deriding a leaked draft as ‘an insult to the
United Kingdom’ before demanding how ‘we need to take back control of our borders
and […] to control our own welfare system’ (Clarke et al., 2017, p. 25). With much of
the British press also disparaging, Cameron was in a precarious position trying to ‘sell
reforms to a sceptical electorate that clearly wanted more than they were being oﬀered’
(Clarke et al., 2017, p. 26). The settlement was nonetheless ratiﬁed on 20 February and
on returning from Brussels, the Prime Minister announced the referendum would take
place on 23 June 2016.
Cameron himself then proceeded to spearhead the oﬃcial Britain Stronger in Europe
campaign. It had the support of the main Westminster political parties, major business
groupings, trade unions, and many civil society organizations, and the backing of inﬂuen-
tial institutions like the International Monetary Foundation and key foreign leaders,
including US President Barack Obama. Its principal message was that Britain’s prospective
withdrawal from the EU – now termed Brexit – would be a ‘risk not worth taking’ vis-a-vis
jobs and economic stability11. Those working toward a Brexit included Grassroots Out and
Leave.EU (the latter headed by UKIP leader Nigel Farage), both oﬀering strident anti-
establishment and anti-immigration messages bordering on a ‘melancholic racialized
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nationalism’ (Shilliam, 2018). Keen to avoid any ‘Farage paradox’12, the oﬃcial Vote Leave
campaign – fronted by several cabinet Ministers, including Michael Gove and London
Mayor, Boris Johnson – were concerned to present the referendum as a unique opportu-
nity to regain democratic sovereignty over Britain’s legislature while claiming the country
would be ‘freer, fairer, and better oﬀ outside the EU’ (Gove, 2016). Into the ﬁnal month of
campaigning, Remain reinforced the narrative of economic risk: on 15 June Chancellor
George Osborne declared how the consequences of a Leave vote would force an ‘emer-
gency budget’ comprising tax increases and a further reduction of funding for health
and education (Parker & Allen, 2016). Meanwhile, and now adopting the slogan ‘Vote
Leave: Take Back Control’, Leave began turning some explicit focus on to immigration13
(Johnson, 2016), border controls, and EU ﬁnances, the latter translated into a now infa-
mous message about ﬁscal redistribution: ‘We send the EU £350 million a week. Let’s
fund our NHS [National Health Service] instead’ (Watkins, 2016, p. 17). Amid a campaign
tarnished by fear-mongering, toxic xenophobia, personal defamation, and scandalous
bouts of mendacity, the validity of such a claim appeared to matter little (Behr, 2016; Lan-
chester, 2016; Prentoulis, 2017; Wright, 2017).
In the run-up to the Referendum opinion polls were generally predicting a narrow
Remain victory. Indeed as polls closed, no public ﬁgure appeared to be predicting other-
wise. So as the shock result was conﬁrmed, Nigel Farage mixed visible astonishment with
delight when proudly proclaiming 23rd June to be Britain’s ‘Independence Day’14 (Ahmed,
2016; Fraser, 2016). In his brief resignation speech, Cameron confessed that with the
people choosing a ‘diﬀerent path… the country requires fresh leadership to take it in
this direction’ (Stewart, Mason, & Syal, 2016). Emotions ranged from unbridled joy and
hope at the prospect of self-government to panic, anger, sadness, abjection and numb-
ness15 (Anderson & Wilson, 2018). The Guardian journalist, Gary Younge, could be for-
given for imagining he was scripting a farcical political satire while reporting not so much
of a ‘failed state as a state intent on failure’:
One week ago, against the advice of its political establishment, Britain narrowly voted to leave
the European Union. Within a few days, that establishment was in the process of a full-scale
implosion: the country is eﬀectively without government or opposition, shorn of leadership,
bereft of direction. As the pound crashed and markets tanked, the chancellor of the exche-
quer went missing for three days while Boris Johnson, the most prominent member of the
Leave campaign, spent the weekend not sketching out a plan for the nation’s future, but
playing cricket and writing his column for the Telegraph. Having asserted its right to sover-
eignty, the country can now ﬁnd nobody to actually run it (Younge, 2016).
As the markets eventually semi-stabilized, the people of Britain endeavoured to come to
terms with a suddenly transformed political landscape. And ﬁnally – notwithstanding
some absurd posturing from Johnson and Gove – on 13 July the Conservative Party
appointed the Home Secretary, Theresa May, as the UK Prime Minister. Her inaugural
speech as PM was particularly notable for its underlining of inequality and a sense of
‘burning injustice’ as being at the heart of why people deﬁed the establishment to vote
for Brexit (Doherty, 2016).
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3. Brexit as a ‘revolt of the regions’? uneven development and England’s
distressed localities
Look at the map of those results… those jaw-dropping vote-shares for remain in the
centre of the capital: 69 per cent in Tory Kensington16 and Chelsea; 75 per cent in
Camden; 78 per cent in Hackney, contrasted with comparable shares for leave in such
places as Great Yarmouth (71 per cent), Castle Point in Essex (73 per cent), and
Redcar and Cleveland (66 per cent). Here is a country so imbalanced it has eﬀectively
fallen over (Harris, 2016).
Those on the remain side who felt they didn’t recognise their own country when they woke
up on Friday morning [on the 24 June 2016] must spare a thought for the pensioner in
Redcar or Wolverhampton who has been waking up every morning for the last 30 years,
watching factories close and businesses move while the council cuts back services and
foreigners arrive, wondering where their world has gone to (Younge, 2016).
Public consciousness about a divided UK is not peculiar to the Brexit result. Victor-
ian Britain continues to remain synonymous with unspeakable inequality. Relatively
more recently, the late 1980s witnessed concerns about a wealthier ‘southern’
England pulling away from the rest of the UK vis-a-vis a widening ‘North-South
divide’ or a Thatcherite ‘Two-Nations’ state project (Jessop et al., 1988; Lewis & Town-
send, 1989). Political economic restructuring through a selective ‘rationalization’ and
privatization of key industrial sectors – early steps in the conjunctural neoliberalization
of the UK (Hall, 2011) – saw numerous towns and cities in the ‘northern periphery’
alongside some erstwhile ‘manufacturing heartlands’ in the midlands subjected to a
‘rapid and sustained geography of deindustrialization’ (Martin, 1989, p. 30). This
helped precipitate a 30 per cent reduction in manufacturing employment between
1979 and 1987. In pursuing restrictive monetary policies, the Thatcher governments
also further squeezed investment in manufacturing-dependent regions while stimulating
the ﬁnancial and banking sectors located primarily in the southeast, especially following
the 1986 ‘big bang’ deregulation of the City (Martin, 1989, p. 46). Thatcherism therefore
intensiﬁed economic, geographical, social, and indeed political divisions between the
south and the rest of the UK (Hudson & Williams, 1995). As the scale of regional
inequality modiﬁed after the early 1990s recession, the debt-fuelled economic boom
that ensued between the mid-1990s and mid-2000s allied to New Labour’s (at times
stealthily presented) redistributive policies helped reduce overall levels of poverty
(Joyce & Sibieta, 2013). It is further estimated that over the decade state-funded jobs
in the public and private sectors accounted for 73 per cent of employment growth in
the Northeast, 67 per cent in Yorkshire and Humberside, and 62 per cent in the North-
west, helping boost relative output per head in northern regions (Hazeldine, 2017).
And yet New Labour’s Third Way vision to blend a neo-liberalizing economy with a
reformed social state (Hall, 2003) failed to reduce overall inequality (Joyce & Sibieta,
2013). This was primarily a consequence of dramatically hiked rewards for the rich17,
with London a seemingly irresistible wealth magnet (Massey, 2007), remaining so even
in the aftermath of the ﬁnancial crash. Indeed when compared to the UK average (UK
= 100), GDP per capita in Greater London rose from 152 in 1998 to 172 in 2013: the equiv-
alent in Wales was 101 in 1998 tumbling to 72 by 2013 while the northeast ﬁgure reduced
from 85 to 74 (Martin, Pike, Tyler, & Gardiner, 2016). Putting this into context, average
household incomes in Wales, Northern Ireland and the northern regions of England stood
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at 60 per cent of those in Greater London; and only in London and the south-east were
earnings – when adjusted for inﬂation – at a higher level in 2016 than they were ten
years previously (Elliott, 2017). Indeed since 2007 wage inequality in the UK has grown
more than any other country in the EU while real wages have fallen more than anywhere
except Greece (Le Galès, 2016). It is no surprise therefore that across the EU 27 countries
Britain stands apart as the most imbalanced economy and unevenly developed socioeco-
nomic landscape (Martin et al., 2016): output per head a staggering ‘eight times higher in
inner west London [which includes Kensington and Chelsea mentioned by Harris above]
than in west Wales and the Valleys, the largest diﬀerence to be found in any EU
member state from Bantry Bay to the Dniester’ (Hazeldine, 2017, p. 67).
In conjuncture with all this, the political strategy undertaken by the 2010–2015
Coalition government to impose a programme of austerity – ‘an excuse to dismantle
social programs’ (Krugman, 2012) – rather than one of state-backed investment inevitably
led to a ﬁscal starvation of provincial regional economies. It resulted in a drastic cut of 14
per cent in the public-sector workforce of England’s North East: a merciless approach par-
ticularly given how, amid the frenzy of the North Atlantic ﬁnancial crisis, New Labour had
intervened with public money to save Britain’s major banks while facilitating the Bank of
England to feed ‘quantitative easing’, in eﬀect boosting the London job market by 18 per
cent while further enhancing the lavish spending power of the capital’s über-rich (Gordon,
2018; Hazeldine, 2017). Further, through punitive cuts in tax credits and housing and dis-
ability beneﬁts alongside savage reductions in local government funding (Toynbee &
Walker, 2017), the austerity state has impacted disproportionately on people in older
industrial areas, jaded seaside resorts, and now by-passed towns such that ‘by 2016,
there were causes enough for a protest vote’ (Callinicos, 2017; Watkins, 2016, p. 10).
The seaside resort of Blackpool, with a population of 140,000, is a case in point. At the
turn of the millennium it had been muted by New Labour ministers as a potential
casino mecca, a ‘Las Vegas of the north’ (Ahmed & Mathiason, 2002). But this failed to
materialize, and in recent years its local authority has been forced to endure the highest
rates of reduction in governmental welfare spending anywhere in the UK (Neville,
2016). As years of suspended optimism eventually mutated into disappointment and
despondency, 68 per cent of those who cast a vote in the EU referendum did so for
Leave, the most decisive ﬁgure in the North West region.
While Remain achieved respectability in the North West’s two major cities – Liverpool
at 58 per cent and Manchester at 60 per cent – and albeit more marginally in Leeds, York-
shire, and Newcastle in the North East, out of 72 constituent areas in the north, less than a
dozen heeded the warnings of the Britain Stronger in Europe political-cultural elite that a
vote to leave the EU would leave northern England more ‘economically and politically
marginalized’ (Clarke et al., 2017, p. 44). Indeed what the referendum map of England
reveals is how the spaces of Remain in the North and Midlands are akin to exposed
islands: such that when Manchester City is joined by its satellite towns – including
Oldham at 61 per cent Leave and Wigan at 64 per cent – then Greater Manchester trans-
lates into an overall Leave majority (Hazeldine, 2017). Sharpening the focus more, while
reporting on the referendum from Manchester, John Harris (2016) revealed the contrast
between people in the hard-pressed district of Collyhurst on the city’s northern edge, who
were all planning to vote Leave – one stating that ‘if you’ve got money, you vote in, if you
haven’t got money, you vote out’ – and others congregated only ten minutes away at a
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graduate recruitment fair: for here nine out of ten people were planning to vote Remain,
one young graduate proclaiming how ‘in the end, this is the 21st century, get with it’.
Harris confessed his own discomfort, not just about the crushing inequality but also
about ‘the sulphurous whiﬀ of… a kind of misshapen class war’. To be sure, these congre-
gations may have been situated within a mile and a half of each other but their respective
worlds are very far apart (Fraser, 2016).
As mentioned earlier, it was the two Midlands regions that recorded the highest pro-
portions for Leave at 59 per cent: the cities of Wolverhampton, Nottingham, and Birming-
ham with majorities, while the town of Boston at 76 per cent – and with relatively high
numbers of migrants from eastern Europe and consequently a target for UKIP – recorded
the highest Vote Leave in the UK. And in the northern regions – where turnout was
between ﬁve and ten percentage points up on recent general elections – Yorkshire and
Humberside and the North East had percentages of 58 and the North West a relatively
lower 54. Northern towns like Hull, Rotherham, and Barnsley voted Leave by over 65
per cent while decisive majorities were recorded across the Pennine ex-mill towns of
Burnley, Bury, and Bradford as well as former coal-mining strongholds in south Yorkshire
like Doncaster and Wakeﬁeld (Watkins, 2016). Aside from Newcastle, urban areas on the
rivers Tyne, Tees, and Wear also paid little attention to the Remain camp’s steadfast fore-
warning of an impending economic apocalypse: Stockton-on-Tees was 60:40 Leave while
two former bastions of ship-building – Sunderland and Hartlepool – voted decisively for
Leave as did the steel-towns of Middlesbrough and Redcar-Cleveland18 (Hazeldine, 2017).
Larry Elliott, The Guardian economics editor was in little doubt as to why:
… old industrial Britain is still suﬀering from the consequences of the closure of factories and
pits three or four decades ago. These communities have higher levels of unemployment and
higher concentrations of people on disability beneﬁt, and have suﬀered much more grie-
vously from government welfare cuts. Unsurprisingly, they were also strongly in favour of
leave. North of the line that runs from the Severn estuary to the Wash, Brexit was the culmi-
nation of a 40-year process of de-industrialisation and casualisation of work. It was a protest
about dead-end jobs, and about run-down communities being lorded over by London, talked
down to and bossed around (Elliott, 2017).
An analogous assessment was provided by the former Labour Chancellor and Prime
Minister, Gordon Brown (2016), who contended that ‘[I]t was a revolt of the regions –
northern industrial towns hit by wave after wave of crushing global change – that
pushed the Brexit vote over the edge’19 (see also Rodríguez-Pose, 2018; Shilliam, 2018).
Perhaps then it was no coincidence that nine months prior to the EU referendum, the
major steelworks at Redcar – containing the second largest blast furnace in Europe –
was closed precipitating a loss of 3,000 jobs following a calamitous withdrawal of invest-
ment from the Thai multinational SSI (Beer, 2018). Given how the Conservative govern-
ment – recently elected in May 2015 – showed so little appetite to intervene on behalf of
the plant and the workers, it was little wonder the community began drawing unfavour-
able comparisons with the UK state’s earlier willingness to bail out the banking sector fol-
lowing the 2008–2009 ﬁnancial crisis. Indeed, as outlined by the economist Ann Pettifor:
… Re-regulating the British economy in favour of ﬁnance and enriching the 1 per cent while
shrinking labour’s share of income resulted in rising inequality and lit a still smouldering fuse
of popular resentment… Resentment made most explicit in the Brexit vote (Pettifor, 2017,
pp. 129–130).
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Relating closely to this, Allan Cochrane has recently demonstrated the prescience of
Doreen Massey’s writings for understanding the Brexit conjuncture. For in her 2007
book, World City, Massey envisioned how ‘the overwhelming concentration of the very
wealthy into London [and] the South-East sharpens the inequality […] within the
country [while their] geographical concentration into a self-referential echo chamber
reinforces the distance from the rest of us’ (Massey, 2007, p. 66; Cochrane, 2018, pp.
194–195). Developing Massey’s ideas further, Cochrane underlines the corrosive eﬀect
of this concentrated economic geography on housing costs within London and beyond
just as many of London’s ﬂagship projects are championed to have a ‘national’ priority:
all of which serves ‘to reinforce a political agenda which includes a commitment to dereg-
ulation and an emphasis on the “untouchability” of the ﬁnancial sector and a drive
towards privatization of various sorts’ (Cochrane, 2018, p. 192; also Atkinson, Parker,
& Burrows, 2017). It is a political agenda actively enabled via the principal sites of the
national state – Whitehall, Parliament, judiciary, ﬁnancial – strategically incorporating
a social base of economic actors in the service of a neoliberal accumulation regime that
privileges interest-bearing ﬁnancial capital at the expense of capital in the production of
tradeable commodities: a process that accelerates the uneven development of the UK
space economy leaving a London super-class over-compensated while much of the
north and midlands nurses renewed scars of deindustrialization (Bachmann & Sidaway,
2016; Elliott, 2017; Hazeldine, 2017; Jessop, 2018a; King & Le Galès, 2017; Martin et al.,
2016). Thus, as Cochrane contends, any notion that Brexit resulted from the votes of
those ‘left behind’ by globalization demands an appreciation of geographical uneven devel-
opment: a process whereby the capitalist search for high-yielding proﬁt inheres a dynamic
and inconstant ‘locational see-saw’ type movement (Smith, 1982) between those places of
development or ‘growth’ and under-development or ‘decline’; the conclusion of which is
that, for many people:
voting to leave the EU was also a way of voting against the eﬀects of uneven development
driven through an economic and political system focused on London and the needs of its
elites (Cochrane, 2018, p. 195).
4. Explaining the ‘capital of Brexit’: economic abandonment and political
disaﬀection in Stoke-on-Trent
Stoke-on-Trent is not so much hollowing out as it is ﬁlling up with contrasts.…And perhaps
that shouldn’t surprise us. The populist victories of 2016 were, after all, close; only slightly
over half of the Britons who voted chose to leave the European Union, while slightly
under half of the Americans who voted chose Trump as president. These were not decisive
rejections of globalization. The complaints are not about openness to the world and the econ-
omic gains it has brought but about their uneven distribution. A place like Stoke, with its 69
percent vote for Brexit, may just have more to complain about than most (Morris, 2017;
emphasis added).
The decent jobs, which once gave people dignity, have trickled away – replaced by insecure,
poorly paid work in services and distribution. The pubs, the labour clubs and the mutual
societies that tethered these working communities together – that’s gone too. For decade,
after decade, after decade, the working men and women of Stoke-on-Trent felt forgotten.
But Brexit changed all that (Reverend Geoﬀ Eze, 2017).
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The city of Stoke-on-Trent (often abbreviated to Stoke) was created in 1910 as a poly-
centric federation of six erstwhile separate towns, namely Burslem, Fenton, Hanley,
Longton, Stoke, and Tunstall. It is located ‘betwixt and between’ the West Midlands
and North West, and in turn the more illustrious cities of Birmingham and Manchester
(Rice, 2010), and represents an archetypal tale of the rise and the traumatic decline of a
resource-based urban economy. At the heart of this was the North Staﬀordshire
coalﬁeld, dating back to the thirteenth century alongside the ﬂourishing of clay pottery
during the eighteenth century giving rise to small towns with ‘pot-banks’ and densely
settled housing (Beaver, 1964). And while the industrial revolution expanded the scope
for mining and facilitated the origins of local steel-making, it was ceramics that
imposed ‘a distinctive landscape and a seemingly indelible identity onto the region’
(Jayne, 2004, p. 200) alongside its moniker The Potteries (Edensor, 2001). By the mid-nine-
teenth century, the city-region was producing 90 per cent of British pottery and 70 per cent
of the worldwide market for exported ceramics – including emblematic brands like Wedg-
wood and Royal Doulton – to the extent that sixty per cent of employees in Stoke worked
in pottery manufacture (Imrie, 1991). The expansion and local dominance of pottery con-
tinued into the twentieth century. And by the end of the 1920s, female employees in the
industry outnumbered male by two to one20; although this being a time when women
under thirty were still being denied the right to vote, their wages were often signiﬁcantly
lower than those of male colleagues (Imrie, 1989, 1991).
The period following the Second World War is widely characterized as a Fordist ‘long
boom’ with unprecedented economic growth in the developed countries, propelled not
least by light manufacturing and consumer goods (Aglietta, 1979). Of course, such devel-
opment was highly uneven, and like many parts of industrial Britain (Hudson, 1989;
Hudson & Williams, 1995), Stoke did not much feature as a site for these propulsive
Fordist sectors, bar nominal exceptions like Michelin Tyres (Imrie, 1991). This was
partly a consequence of not being designated a Development or Intermediate Area: a
status for which local politicians and planners did campaign, but at that time unemploy-
ment levels and indices of socioeconomic ‘deprivation’ were not comparable with places
like Clydeside or the Birmingham conurbation (Ball, 1993). In due course, however,
Stoke’s dependence upon long-established industries was to have catastrophic conse-
quences. During the 1960s a succession of mergers led to 7000 job losses in pottery.
Further, as nationalized industries ‘rationalized’ in the face of international competition
(Hudson, 1986), a technological ‘upgrade’ in the North Staﬀordshire coalﬁelds precipi-
tated 13,000 redundancies between the mid-1950s and mid-1970s while the steel plant
at Shelton21 – which employed 3400 in 1967 – was closed in 1980 following a bitter
labour dispute (Imrie, 1991). The harrowing aftermath of the 1970s economic crisis
also devastated the pottery industry, as between 1978 and 1981 thirty-six factories
closed and 10,000 jobs shed (Imrie, 1989). Given how 80 per cent of Stoke’s pottery
was exported overseas, the high exchange rates that emerged between 1979 and 1980 –
a consequence of the 1979 Thatcher government’s unbending commitment to monetar-
ism, deﬂation, and expenditure cuts – were eﬀectively a death warrant. Of course, its tra-
ditional industrial form, relatively northern location and support for the Labour Party
rendered Stoke to be dislocated from the core social base of the Thatcherite ‘two-
nations’ project (Jessop et al., 1988).
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During the 1980s and 1990s Stoke became a primary victim of the state-orchestrated
decimation of manufacturing alluded to earlier. While this was partly oﬀset by a rise in
retail, distribution, and warehousing, the net outcome resulted in lower productivity,
increased unemployment and a surplus of skilled workers in low-skilled, low-paid, and
often part-time employment (Ball, 1993). Not that this qualiﬁed Stoke for regional assist-
ance, as Thatcher’s ideological antipathy to state intervention saw regional policy ‘stream-
lined’ to become part of a new ‘enterprise initiative’ (Martin, 1989). The latter hastened a
profusion of agencies like Enterprise Trusts, Business Links, and Training and Enterprise
Councils (TECs) with boards dominated by local business interests feverishly coaxed to
nurture local enterprise (Peck, 1995). Staﬀordshire TEC thereby began supplying a
‘ﬂexible’ workforce for a low value-added services economy (Jones, 1998). And recent
decades have witnessed a revolving door of ‘regeneration’ agencies: New Labour creations
Advantage West Midlands22 and the North Staﬀordshire Regeneration Partnership23 abol-
ished by the Coalition Government in favour of a Stoke-on-Trent and Staﬀordshire Enter-
prise Partnership (Crowley, Balaram, & Lee, 2012) Toynbee and Walker (2017, p. 78).
characterize such Local Enterprise Partnerships as ‘specimens of the administrative
exotica created by ministers who would rather do nothing but can’t get away with it.
[And further as…] committees of business people who give grants to… local business
people’ with conveniently opaque ﬁnancial arrangements. Relatedly, with Stoke’s pro-
ductivity the fourth lowest in England and wages four-ﬁfths the national average (CSC,
2017), evidence points toward a signiﬁcant ‘corporate welfare’ subsidizing private ﬁrms
who return the favour with lower wages and little enhancement in training and skills
(Farnsworth, 2015). Not that such corporate welfare has been suﬃcient to prevent Wedg-
wood outsourcing its ceramics production to Indonesia, something that has:
… left the workers, many of whom came from families that had worked in the potteries over
three generations, feeling abandoned and betrayed by an industry that appeared indiﬀerent to
what closing the factories entailed: the destruction of itsworkers’wayof life (Evans, 2017, p. 215).
These feelings of disappointment and abandonment as long embedded local corpor-
ations sought proﬁt maximization via alternative spatial divisions of labour (Massey,
1984) are mirrored somewhat in local politics. And in conjunctural terms, the antagonisms
in each ‘fused into a ruptural unity’ (Hall, Critcher, et al., 2013) when seeking to explain the
volume of support for Brexit in Stoke-on-Trent. While Labour has held all three Stoke-on-
TrentWestminster seats since 1950, it lost Stoke South to the Conservative candidate in the
2017 election. Moreover, in local government the sustained hegemony of the Labour Party
also ended with the election of an Independent Mayor in 2002 (Jayne, 2012). And while the
Mayoral system itself was short-lived24, the Labour Party’s failure to revive Stoke’s econ-
omic fortunes alongside some limited success for councillors representing the avowedly
racist British National Party has left it struggling to regain its legitimacy to govern the
city. Reporting on the 2016 EU referendum – this time from Stoke – John Harris (2017)
identiﬁed that while local Labour Party members may have been campaigning in
numbers for Remain, ‘Leave was doing a brisk trade among not just white voters but
also British-Asian people’; and that furthermore there ‘was a sense of a long-dormant pol-
itical relationship between party and people that had now reached the point of an indiﬀer-
ence tinged with bitterness’.
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Perhaps such indiﬀerence had been exacerbated by the ‘parachuting in’ of the author, aca-
demic, telegenic face, and New Labour apparatchik Tristram Hunt as MP for Stoke Central
in 2010. Either way, in the aftermath of the Brexit result, Hunt resigned his seat to become
Director of the Victoria and Albert Museum, which many interpreted as a return to his elite
metropolitan sanctuary. Nonetheless, in his resignation letter, Hunt (2017) wrote aﬀectingly
about witnessing ‘Detroit-style’ poverty and inequality whereby one in twelve (7,235) of the
city’s private homes remain empty. Hunt’s resignation initiated a by-election in February
2017. And it was Stoke’s very status as the UK city with the highest Brexit majority that
prompted Paul Nuttall, who had replaced Nigel Farage as UKIP leader, to contest the
vacated seat. Although from Merseyside, Nuttall was at pains to convince local people he
had ‘more in common’ with them than Mr Hunt, and with promises to reduce immigra-
tion25 and prioritise public housing for local people, he bellowed:
I can be a voice for Stoke. Stoke was the capital of Brexit. On February 23 it can be the capital
of change. It can’t be right that 60,000 people in Stoke-on-Trent live on the breadline (Paul
Nuttall, 23 January, 2017; cited in Bounds, 2017).
Nuttall lost the by-election to the Labour Party candidate Gareth Snell, but picked up one-
quarter of the votes pushing the Conservatives into third place. Like many MPs across the
UK, Snell represents a constituency facing enormous challenges. There are spaces of hope.
On a return visit, Guardian journalist, John Domokos (2018a, 2018b), revealed the
acumen, energy and imagination of citizens from many backgrounds, including artists,
youth leaders, and those who elevated Stoke into contention for UK City of Culture
2021. What remains of the potteries are now taking on ceramics workers again. And
there is a renewed emphasis on further education meeting the aspirations of local commu-
nities in a ‘post-Brexit’ economic landscape (Stoke on Trent College, 2018). But such well-
springs of optimism cannot mask how the metropolitan landscape of Stoke is enduring a
catastrophic fallout from prolonged austerity: many constituents remain in poorly
rewarded work – 16,000 are on Employment Support Allowance – and thousands
endure poor health and are dependent upon Incapacity Beneﬁt. In turn, since June
2018, 25 per cent of Stoke’s population have been adversely aﬀected by changes in Univer-
sal Credit, estimated to be evacuating £73 million per year from the local economy (CSC,
2017). Phil Corrigan, political correspondent at the Stoke Sentinel, believes the appeal for
Brexit in the city relates to a wider malaise:
There is a general disaﬀection with politics…Membership of the EU has coincided with four
decades of decline in Stoke that started in the 1970s. They [the voters] conﬂated two things.
They thought, ‘maybe if we can break free from the EU there is a chance we can get our
industry back’ (cited in Bounds, 2017).
Yet at the same time the Stoke-based British Ceramic Confederation pleads for tariﬀ-free
access to the single market (Toynbee, 2017). Like everywhere throughout the UK, the
intricate anomalies of Brexit become increasingly evident with each passing day.
5. The austerity state in a Brexit conjuncture: governmental discord and
the ‘exhaustion of consent’
The simple choice proposed in the referendum campaign enabled the Brexiteers, to their own
surprise in many cases, to call forth and energize a large and increasingly volatile section of
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the electorate that had previously been alienated from politics often by reason of 30 years of
growing inequality and powerlessness but were now determined to make their voices heard.
What had been disagreement within the elite, within the ‘Westminster bubble’ was now out
in society as a whole, creating a new and uncertain situation for the foreseeable future
(Morgan, 2016, p. 828).
Here, in Jaywick, we are on the edge of the English land mass, but we also appear to be on the
edges of government and the state (John Harris, in Harris and Domokos, 2014).
Among numerous anomalies or paradoxical characteristics of the Brexit result (Clarke
& Newman, 2017) was the revelation that many less prosperous localities in the UK whose
communities voted to leave the EU are precisely those most dependent upon its single
market for trade while also being beneﬁciaries of EU Cohesion Policy support over
several decades (Los, McCann, Springford, & Thissen, 2017; McCann, 2018). A notable
instance concerns people in the city of Sunderland in the north east whose futures are
highly dependent on the Nissan car factory and its access to a tariﬀ-free EU market but
who yet voted in favour of the UK exiting the EU. As McCann (2018) acknowledges,
most observers would deem such behaviour to be ostensibly quite irrational. It is also at
odds with previous referenda which have tended to favour the status quo option, particu-
larly if the outcome is seen to place in jeopardy the economic security of voters (Clarke
et al., 2017). And it may well have been with the latter uppermost in mind that the
Britain Stronger In Europe campaign embarked upon a sustained bombardment of
detailed statistics from a range of organizations – including the Bank of England, the Con-
federation of British Industry, and the Institute for Fiscal Studies – about how Brexit
would be catastrophic for the national economy while also placing many jobs at risk. It
is now widely assumed, however, that such coolly reasoned macroeconomic logic
lacked resonance with the lived experiences and consciousness of many voters (Airas,
2017; Closs Stephens, 2016; Freedland, 2017; Marr, 2016). It is a disjuncture encapsulated
in a public meeting in Newcastle just prior to the referendum, when a warning from one
panellist of how a Brexit vote might lead to slower GDP prompted an audience member to
react with: ‘That’s your bloody GDP, not mine26. It was a response that:
… neatly epitomized not only an increasingly cynical attitude towards expertise, but more
speciﬁcally, a belief that, whilst pro-Remain politicians might not necessarily be lying, they
were describing a reality from another planet (the prosperous South-East).… hence talk of
economic recovery from the ﬁnancial crisis was liable to be met with laughter outside of
the M25. Equally, while the aggregate economic impact of immigration has been positive,
statements to that eﬀect failed to convince people on the wrong side of the economic
fence, or who saw (or thought they saw) increases in migrant numbers directly impacting
on their daily lives (Evans & Menon, 2017, pp. 62–63).
There is little denying that the groundswell for Vote Leave was about material inequality,
further evidenced by the 2017 Social Mobility Commission report which revealed 60 of the
65 most disadvantaged areas as having voted Leave27 (Behr, 2017). However, as alluded to
above, it also related to a growing sense of disconnect between citizens and the institutions
of government. Not least in that ministerial auto-cued assurances about a purported post-
crash economic recovery and GDP rates increasingly translate as remote abstractions
which just do not square with the experience of rising living costs, with the pressure of per-
forming three part-time jobs while organizing a household and on occasion reluctantly
using a food bank, or perhaps being among the one quarter of families where 21–34
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year olds live with their parents (Froud, Johal, & Williams, 2016). And here – in an echo
the 1980s north-south divide and its broad-brushed representation of inequality (Lewis &
Townsend, 1989) – so our analytical focus on Brexit’s geography being primarily about a
‘revolt’ of distressed localities in the north and midlands of England becomes over-
reached. For while remain majorities were certainly registered in Bristol and wealthier
towns in the south such as Bath, Reading, and Windsor, these were oﬀset by the ex-indus-
trial ports of Dover, Plymouth and Portsmouth, retirement resorts like Bournemouth and
Eastbourne, ex-ﬁshing towns such as King’s Lynn and Great Yarmouth (both above 70 per
cent Leave), alongside the Thames estuary, where Thurrock, Basildon and Clacton-on-Sea
were all around 70 per cent in favour of Leave.
Indeed nowhere reveals the scale of uneven development that has ripped the United
Kingdom asunder in recent decades more than the seaside village of Jaywick. Sitting on the
Essex coast two miles from Clacton and only 60 miles from central London, it is the most
‘deprived’ council ward in England, described by one commentator as ‘a fractured, broken
place’ (Rodger, 2016). In 2014, journalists John Harris and John Domokos visited Jaywick as
one of several places that had been witnessing a notable upsurge in support for UKIP.
Drawing parallels with the discussion of Stoke-on-Trent, they uncover a socio-political land-
scape punctuated by ‘poverty, anger and the breakdown of normal politics’ just as their engage-
ment with residents exposed an overwhelming sense of disaﬀection for mainstream
Westminster parties, one respondent urging politicians to ‘start listening to the people who
vote for you’. It was a context within which Nigel Farage’s UKIP – a free-market and anti-
state ‘force made up largely of Tory exiles [but which] has managed to style itself as a party
for the working class’ – endeavoured to promote its nativist appeals to ‘patriotism’ and anti-
immigration (Shilliam, 2018). Certainly it was diﬃcult to imagine the Britain Stronger In
Europe message being anything other than ridiculed among Jaywick residents (Vidal, 2016).
Despondency of this sort ﬁnds resonance in ethnographic work conducted by McKenzie
(2017a; 2017b). For she uncovers how – in discussing their plans to vote Leave while also
openly conscious of how their views would be derided by the political elite and metropolitan
commentariat – working class female communities in East London and ex-mining towns of
Nottinghamshire internalize a sense not just of being ‘left behind’ but of not being listened to
and indeed of ‘not existing’. It is in this context that a prescient paper published in advance
of the Brexit referendum might oﬀer crucial insights to help comprehend this exhaustion of
consent for the neoliberal political economicmainstream (cf. Hall, Critcher, et al., 2013), and of:
… the very real sense of democratic and political disenfranchisement that is experienced in
[many] constituencies… that ﬁnds expression in one of two ways: as simple apathy and non-
participation; or as organised opposition to UK membership of the EU and support for the
virtual ending of mass immigration. This combination of policies propelled UKIP into third
place in the national vote, and represents a complex set of implicit and explicit demands,
which are not solely motivated by old-fashioned racism, xenophobia and conservative
authoritarianism. Hostility to the EU, and to patterns of migration which appear to trans-
form their communities and localities without any consultation with them, can also be
understood as, in part, expressions of frustration with the lack of meaningful democratic par-
ticipation (Gilbert, 2015, pp. 39–40).
More than this, though, as Clarke and Newman incisively identify, Gilbert’s analysis of a
‘post-democratic feeling’28 uncovers many of the social forces that appeared to have been
mobilized in the Vote Leave campaign, and which on 23 June 2016 ‘fused into a ruptural
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unity’ (Hall, Critcher, et al., 2013, p. xv). It is, moreover, in this regard that their invoking of a
conjuctural approach reaps reward in disclosing the diversity of contradictory forces, the cul-
turally inﬂected processes of anxiety and revulsion, alongside ostensibly illogical choices. Thus:
Despite the temptations of identifying the one ‘real’ cause, conjunctural analysis invites us to
think about how various lines of force […] intersected with the fracturing of apparently
established governmental and political formations (from the crises of the European Union
to the disuniting of the United Kingdom). These lines of force were recombined in new
articulations and found new voicings that promised to overcome the failures and frustrations,
as well as the contradictions and antagonisms of the existing arrangements (Clarke &
Newman, 2017, pp. 112–113).
This approach enabled Clarke and Newman to analyse the sizeable support for and
decisive impact of Vote Leave among middle-class voters (Chakrabortty, 2016). Not
least in how the widespread assumption that the UK middle classes were characterized
by a cosmopolitan liberalism somehow inevitably prompting them to vote Remain”
omits from the overall frame how Brexit was supported by a traditional ‘middle class in
the suburbs, small towns, and shires that remained resolutely “non-cosmopolitan” and
were apparently consumed by immigration anxiety (despite such spaces not being occu-
pied by many migrants)’ (Clarke & Newman, 2017, p. 106)29. This ﬁnding facilitates a
clearer vision of how fractions of the Leave campaign could exploit the potent combi-
nation of an erosion of disaﬀected consent allied to immigration anxiety: ‘structures of
feeling (Williams, 1977) which in turn were duly intensiﬁed via populist ventriloquism
from Gove, Johnson, and Farage, each distinguishing themselves from the metropolitan
‘cosmopolitan’ elite30 fronting Remain, while claiming to speak for ordinary people’s
sense of loss (as in for example, the ‘great’ in Great Britain), of betrayal and growing
sense of abandonment, and to oﬀer promises about ‘taking back control’ (over borders)
and ‘put the country back in charge of our destiny’31 (Clarke & Newman, 2017). This
struggle around the organic order of British societal values and identity (Jessop, 2018a)
is superbly encapsulated in Craig Calhoun’s assessment of how:
Brexit is an expression of English – more than British – nationalism and is part of a decades-
long decline in British unity. But the England that wants out of Europe is the England of van-
ished industry in the north, rural poverty in the southwest and people clinging to middle-
class lifestyles in the suburbs of once-great cities that feel increasingly alien to them
(Calhoun, 2016, p. 52).
This decline in unity is paralleled in discord at the heart of the post-referendum state as
David Cameron’s petulant endeavour to ‘put to bed’ the Europe question has wreaked
untold havoc. It is worth reﬂecting on how his government unashamedly oﬀered state pri-
vileges to business interests and ﬁnancial elites (Hutton & Adonis, 2018; Wright, 2017): and
yet this elite failed to cohere in support of his Remain campaign thereby enabling those on
the Leave campaign to exploit this crisis of political authority (Jessop, 2018a; 2018b). Indeed
as Morgan contends, the Brexit conjuncture witnessed ideological divisions within an elite
that, while generally supportive of further adherence to a neoliberal accumulation regime,
had alternative views about how it might be successfully advanced in the UK context.
However, crucially, these divisions ‘had not only come to the surface but had also [in
turn] activated a broad mass of the population’ (Morgan, 2016, p. 828). Furthermore,
given how successive governments had oﬀered unequivocal support for private over
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public interests – not least through the Private Finance Initiative (Crouch, 2011) – while
squeezing welfare and then imposing austerity, this was a broad mass whose own consent
had been eventually exhausted. It was also a mass whose respect for the words or aspirations
of a remote political elite had eroded just as it had persistently found its own institutions of
support and representation decimated (Beynon & Hudson, 2018; Jessop, 2018a). King and
Le Galès (2017) contend that the populist eruptions of recent years are also seeing a growing
disconnect between the state and the nation, especially given how so many citizens feel dis-
enchanted with the former: but this is surely intensiﬁed in a country whose crisis-ridden
state presides over four separate nations, two of whom now feel angrily unrepresented by
the result of the Brexit referendum result.
After becoming Prime Minister, Theresa May’s approach to negotiating a credible path
to extricate the UK from the EU was to become synonymous with banal agreement-
stalling statements such as ‘Brexit Means Brexit’ and ‘No Deal is Better than a Bad
Deal’, at least before the key document, Article 50,32 was triggered in March 2017. After
which May called an election in June, presumably designed to secure a further full term
of ‘strong and stable’ Conservative rule. But this backﬁred spectacularly, and in order
for legislation to be passed, her government now depends on the votes of the Northern
Ireland ultra-right Democratic Unionist Party. And while the election result signiﬁed a
partial return by voters to the two main parties, the extent to which either might generate
the social base of support required to foster a hegemonic political project is questionable.
Not least in that the referendum has exposed a major disjuncture between the parties and
socio-political and geographical divisions: for just as three-quarters of constituencies held
by the Conservative Party voted for Brexit so too did nearly two-thirds of Labour-held
seats (Clarke et al., 2017; Grey, 2016; Lanchester, 2016). More than this, though, Brexit
has quite simply been placing enormous pressure on the basic functioning of the
British state (Runciman, 2016). Indeed the business of everyday government often
appears at a standstill (Behr, 2018; Williams, 2018; Younge, 2018). New policies seem
incapable of being formulated late alone announced. Ministers who under normal circum-
stances would be held to account for extraordinary mismanagement remain in post. It also
took until July 2018 for the Cabinet to develop a full proposal to initiate a Brexit agree-
ment: the so-called Chequers proposal. At the time of writing, it has led to two Cabinet
resignations by notable Brexiteers, while the terms which propose a single market for
goods but not services quite palpably contravene the principles of the EU while also
leaving unresolved the biggest anomaly of all: the border between the EU and Northern
Ireland (Hayward, 2018). Meanwhile there is a scandalous failure to even begin addressing
the very economic and social inequities and the sources of discontent that generated the
Brexit revolt in the ﬁrst place (Ryan, 2018; Dorling, 2018).
Notes
1. In the UK the working class comprises 46 per cent of the population vis-a-vis social groups
C2, D, and E, with the middle classes categorized as A, B, and C1 (Clarke et al., 2017).
2. The ﬁve regions with the largest aggregate votes in rank order were the South East, London,
North West, East, and South West: https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-36616028.
3. Notably one of Hall’s colleagues was John Clarke himself.
4. These ideas are derived from Gramsci and Althusser (Hall, Critcher, et al., 2013).
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5. It is worth noting that this approach to critical inquiry has been central to commentators
writing regularly in the journal Soundings, particularly in their critique of neoliberalism,
the global ﬁnancial crisis, and austerity.
6. An important seed for this ‘Euroscepticism’ had been planted in 1988 by PM Margaret
Thatcher’s speech in Bruges, where she posed the question as to whether the EU was endan-
gering British sovereignty (Shilliam, 2018).
7. Cameron had seen this up close having spent a brief spell as advisor to Major (Kettle, 2016).
8. Clegg in conversation with colleague, David Laws; cited in Kettle (2016).
9. Much speculation surfaced about whether Cameron genuinely believed his Party would
achieve a majority in 2015 and thereby be mandated to deliver on the referendum commit-
ment (e.g. Jessop, 2017; Kettle, 2016; McTague, 2016).
10. It is interesting to note that prior to the negotiations at least some of the Prime Minister’s
‘competitiveness’ pitch was embraced by the EU as it began withdrawing almost 300 regu-
lations (Evans & Menon, 2017).
11. Indeed only 24 hours after the PM’s announcement, the CEOs of a third of the FTSE 100
companies signed a letter in The Times warning against Brexit (Evans & Menon, 2017).
12. This relates to the apparent irony whereby at the same time as UKIP’s poll rating and mem-
bership would rise, support for actually leaving the EU would drop (Katwala, 2014).
13. On May 26, it was announced that oﬃcial net migration for 2015 was 333,000, three times
higher than the government’s target and the second highest on record. On the strength of
which Dominic Cummings, director of the Vote Leave campaign, is reported to have
instructed Johnson and Gove: “If you want to win this, you have to hit Cameron and
Osborne over the head with a baseball bat with immigration written on it” (Parker, 2016).
14. As Ahmed (2016) points out this rhetoric of ‘Independence Day’ is deeply insensitive to the
lives sacriﬁced in in the struggles for independence in the US and other ex-colonial nations.
15. For examples, see the essays by Fraser, 2016; Freedland, 2016; Garton Ash, 2016; Harding,
2016; Harris, 2016; Jones, 2016; Marr, 2016; Meek, 2016; Streeck, 2016; Watkins, 2016;
Welsh, 2016; Wolf, 2016; and the contributions on “Where Are We Now: Responses to
the Referendum” in London Review of Books, volume 38:14.
16. Kensington and Chelsea is the local authority boundary: they form two constituencies in
national elections. In the 2017 general election, Kensington actually elected a Labour MP
for the ﬁrst time since the constituency was formed in 1974: notably it is the UK constituency
with the highest average income and yet is also the most unequal, a geography tragically
revealed in the Grenfell Tower atrocity on 14 June 2017 (MacLeod, 2018).
17. Former Cabinet minister, Peter Mandelson, once famously admitted that New Labour was
‘intensely relaxed about people getting ﬁlthy rich’.
18. All data gathered from the Financial Times EU Referendum results: https://ig.ft.com/sites/
elections/2016/uk/eu-referendum/.
19. We are left to wonder whether Brown sincerely believes he might have done more during his
own tenure to assist these regions in withstanding such waves.
20. At this time, Stoke-on-Trent had the highest rate of female waged employment in the UK
(Imrie, 1989, 1991).
21. Both the steelworks and several various coal mines had remained proﬁtable and advanced in
technology (Imrie, 1991).
22. New Labour introduced Regional Development Agencies across the nine regions of England.
23. This covered the local authorities of Newcastle-under-Lyme, Staﬀordshire Moorlands, and
the six towns of Stoke-on-Trent (NSRP, 2008).
24. The Mayoral system only ran from 2002 until a return to Cabinet style government in 2008
(Tappin, 2010).
25. At only 3 per cent, like many places that voted majority Brexit and where immigration from
eastern European countries was central to the debate, the percentage of Stoke-on-Trent’s
population born elsewhere in the European Union as low.
26. It is worth noting in this context that Froud et al identify how GDP was initially deployed as a
quantitative measurement emerging from the economic mobilization waged around World
SPACE AND POLITY 19
War II, and thereby question whether it really is the most appropriate way of delineating
economic performance in the ﬁnancialized capitalism of the 21st century.
27. In returning toWales at the timeof theReferendum, journalistDawnFoster sensed that formany
people, voting to leave the EU was a “chance to be heard for once, to kick back at Westminster
and the vast majority of Welsh MPs who voted to remain in the EU” (Foster, 2016, p. 10).
28. There are resonances here with Colin Crouch’s (2004) earlier work on post-democracy as
well as Claus Oﬀe’s (2013) thinking on the emergence of ‘democratic inequality in the aus-
terity state’.
29. While a deep-seated analysis is beyond the scope of this paper, it is worth noting the crucial
role of education: 72 per cent without formal educational qualiﬁcations voted Leave com-
pared to 35 per cent of those with a university degree. Relatedly, those over-55 – a ﬁfth of
the UK population – voted 60:40 in favour of Leave (Watkins, 2016). At the same time it
is also worth noting that thirteen million registered voters did not vote in the referendum
just as seven million eligible adults were not registered to vote, disproportionately the
young, ﬂat-dwellers (especially renters), ethnic minorities, and those recently moving
house (Dorling, 2016).
30. As Rafael Behr (2017) notes it is “hard to stomach Brexiter claims to speak on behalf of the
have-nots when their campaign was supported by tax-shy millionaires [just as] anti-estab-
lishment rhetoric in the mouths of Boris Johnson and Jacob Rees-Mogg is, by any meaningful
social metric, preposterous”.
31. Each of the Leave demagogues have at some stage payed homage to Mrs Thatcher; and there
are distant echoes here of how Thatcher often presented her approach by appearing to rep-
resent ‘the people’ directly, often against the strong state that she was ironically fostering (see
Jessop et al., 1988, p. 83; Jessop, 2017).
32. As Tony Wright (2017) outlines, however, when Article 50 of the Lisbon Treaty declares that
‘any Member State may decide to withdraw from the Union in accordance with its own con-
stitutional arrangements’, Britain – never having established a written Constitution – has
diﬃculty in knowing precisely what its constitutional arrangements are.
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